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a b s t r a c t
This study investigated adolescent males’ decision-making under
risk, and the emotional response to decision outcomes, using
a probabilistic gambling task designed to evoke counterfactu-
ally mediated emotions (relief and regret). Participants were 20
adolescents (aged 9–11), 26 young adolescents (aged 12–15), 20
mid-adolescents (aged 15–18) and 17 adults (aged 25–35). Allwere
male. The ability to maximize expected value improved with age.
However, there was an inverted U-shaped developmental pattern
for risk-seeking. The age atwhich risk-takingwashighestwas14.38
years. Although emotion ratings overall did not differ across age,
there was an increase between childhood and young adolescence
in the strength of counterfactually mediated emotions (relief and
regret) reported after receiving feedback about the gamble out-
come. We suggest that continuing development of the emotional
response to outcomes may be a factor contributing to adolescents’
risky behaviour.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc.
Adolescents tend to engage in ‘risky’ behaviours—those with high subjective desirability but high
potential for harm (Geier & Luna, 2009). These include dangerous driving, unsafe sex and experimen-
tation with addictive substances (Eaton et al., 2008). This phenomenon has led to the suggestion
that adolescents are risk-seeking in general (Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008; Steinberg, 2008), where
risk-seeking can be conceptualised as a behavioural economic preference for decisions with unsure
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outcomes (Knight, 1921). However, engagement in risky behaviours is likely to have a variety of social,
emotional and cognitive causes, and fewempirical studies have directly compared risk-seeking in chil-
dren, adolescents and adults using laboratory-based behavioural tasks (Crone, Bullens, van der Plas,
Kijkuit, & Zelazo, 2008; Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, 2002; Van Leijenhorst, Westeberg, & Crone,
2008; see Boyer, 2006, for review). In the current study, we investigated the development of risk-
seeking between late childhood (age 9) and adulthood (age 35), using a behavioural economic task
that involvedmaking gambling decisions in an emotional context.We expected to observe heightened
risk-seeking in adolescents relative to adults, in line with previous empirical data (Eshel, Nelson, Blair,
Pine, & Ernst, 2007; Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009). In line with theoretical suggestions
(Casey et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2008), as well as recent empirical ﬁndings (O’Brien & Steinberg, 2009),
we hypothesised that adolescents would also show heightened risk-seeking relative to children.
We also examined age differences in emotional responses to gamble outcomes. Choices are inﬂu-
enced by expected gains—the economist’s “expected value” (EV), i.e., the summed values of potential
outcomes weighted by their respective probabilities. However, decisions are also inﬂuenced by how
one expects to feel afterwards. As an example, consider the phenomenon of postcode lotteries. Players
pay a small amount of money each week to buy the chance of winning a large sum of money if their
postcode is drawn fromapool containing all the postcodes in the country. The EV of playing is negative
(i.e., you can expect to lose money if you play), since the chance of winning is very small. However, a
great many people play, and it is thought that their doing so is partly due to emotion. People antici-
pate that they will feel very bad if their postcode is drawn and they did not buy a ticket. They will feel
regret (as well as envy, if a neighbor sharing their postcode bought a ticket). The emotion of regret is a
counterfactuallymediated emotion, as it arises due to counterfactual comparison betweenwhat is and
the more desirable outcome that might have been if a different decision had been made. The positive
counterpart of regret is relief (when the counterfactual comparison favors what is). Anticipation of
counterfactually mediated emotions such as relief and regret may inﬂuence decision-making. Studies
involving gambling tasks have shown deviations from pure EV-maximising behaviour attributable to
participants taking into account the regret their decisions may cause them to feel. They are prepared
to accept smaller rewards to avoid putting themselves at risk of experiencing the unpleasant emotion
of regret (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005; Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007).
Adolescents are thought to show exaggerated or more labile emotional responses to outcomes
compared to children or adults (Casey et al., 2008; Ernst & Mueller, 2007; Ernst et al., 2005; Eshel et
al., 2007). Also, the ability to think counterfactually about the outcomes of decisions may continue to
develop during adolescence (Baird & Fugelsang, 2004). If the anticipation of counterfactuallymediated
emotions plays a key role in decision-making in adults (Coricelli et al., 2007), immaturities in the
genesis or use of counterfactuallymediated emotions such as relief and regret during decision-making
could contribute to risky decision-making in adolescents (Steinberg, 2008). To our knowledge, no
previous study has directly compared the risk-seeking, and associated emotions of relief and regret,
of children and adults.
In the present study, participants aged 9–35 years engaged in a probabilistic gambling task (Camille
et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005) in which paired gambles differed in EV, in risk, and in the potential
to generate counterfactually mediated emotions (relief and regret). In this type of task, an optimal
decision-maker should choose gambles with greater EV, to maximise winnings. However, gambles
with the same EV can differ in their level of risk, where risk is measured as the outcome variance of a
gamble (Bossaerts &Hsu, 2008).We used outcome variance and EV of gambles to identify participants’
utility function (Bossaerts & Hsu, 2008).
Our ﬁrst goal in the current studywas to investigate the impact of EV on choice across age. Although
EV maximisation may continue to develop, we predicted that even the youngest participants would
tend to choose gambles with higher EV, since it has been shown that children as young as age 5 show
a rudimentary sensitivity to EV (Schlottmann, 2001). When 5-year-olds view probabilistic events
associated with different prizes won by a puppet, the level of happiness children judge the puppet
will achieve is proportional to the value of a prize multiplied by its approximate probability, that
is, the approximate EV. However, although probability and value judgment may be mature by mid-
adolescence (Boyer, 2006), the use of such information to guide behaviour in emotional contexts, as
in the current paradigm, may still be developing. In a behavioural economic study by Harbaugh et al.
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(2002), in which participants aged 5–64 years made a series of choices between a certain outcome
and a gamble with equivalent EV, the proportion of unbiased, objective decisions increased with
age. Children’s choices were consistent with an underweighting of low-probability events and an
overweighting of high-probability events; choices of adults were more consistent with an objective
useofprobabilitieswhenevaluating riskyprospects. A studybyLevin,Weller, Pederson, andHarshman
(2007), in which children aged 5–11 and adults chose between gambles differing in EV, also showed
age-related increases in EV-maximising choices. In the current study, we extend this developmental
picture by assessing the ability of children, adolescents andadults tomaximizeEV in choosingbetween
pairs of gambles that differ in EV.
Our second goal was to investigate age differences in the impact of risk on choice. Participants’
preference for riskwas identiﬁedbyassessing the contributionof the varianceof gambles tobehaviour,
where a risk-seeking participant is one who shows a tendency to choose gambles with high variance.
Because the probabilities and outcomes of gambles were shown to participants, risk-seeking in the
present study refers to a truepreference for risk. In contrast, seemingly riskybehaviour in real life could
arise due to a number of factors, including incomplete knowledge of the range of possible outcomes
or a reduced ability to judge their probabilities. We predicted an inverted U-shaped pattern of risk-
seekingbetweenchildhoodandadulthood,with its peak inadolescence, similar to that shown in recent
studies (Figner et al., 2009;O’Brien&Steinberg, 2009). Figner et al. (2009) showed that adolescents (age
13–19), relative to adults (age 20+), failed to take into account value as well as probability information
whenmakingdecisions in anemotional context, and this resulted inmore riskybehaviour. Participants
played a game in which cards shown face down were sequentially turned over to try and gain points.
Cards could be turned over as long as gains were encountered, but once a loss occurred the trial
terminated. A participant must therefore make a decision about when to stop turning over cards,
in order to ﬁnish with a gain of points. Figner et al. found sub-optimal adolescent decision-making
only in an emotional (‘hot’) version of the task, and not in an unemotional (‘cold’) version. Another
study showed that, in a driving game played alone or in the presence of peers, adolescents made poor
decisions relative to adults, but only when friends were present (O’Brien & Steinberg, 2009; Steinberg,
2008). The friends-present condition can be considered a ‘hot’ version of the driving task, the task used
here can also be considered a ‘hot’ task, since it involves making gamble decisions in an emotional
context.
The third goal of the current study was to investigate age differences in counterfactually mediated
emotions (relief and regret). During the gambling task, participants indicated their emotional response
(“How do you feel about what just happened?”) to the outcome of each gamble, using a linear rating
scale. On half of the trials (complete feedback trials), the outcome for the unselected choice was
revealed alongside the outcome for the selected choice, whereas on the other half of trials (partial
feedback trials) the outcome of the selected choice only was revealed. Previous work with adults
has suggested that the complete feedback condition, with outcome of the unselected choice always
revealed, gives rise to a counterfactual comparison between the actual outcome and the outcome
of a foregone alternative (what might have been), and that this comparison modulates self-reported
emotional responses (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005). For example, making a choice that
yields a win of $100 gives rise to a more positive feeling if the unchosen outcome is revealed as $10
rather than $1000.
The emotions participants experience are known as ‘reward-based’ emotions (Rolls, 2005). These
are emotions that are produced by a reinforcer, and depend on the reward contingency (delivery
or omission) and on the type of reinforcer. In previous studies using the present task, galvanic skin
recordings show that gamble outcomes are accompaniedby emotional responses (Camille et al., 2004).
We label these responses in a context-dependent manner, according to the counterfactual and reward
context in which they occur. Thus, a participant’s self-reported emotion in response to a win of points
when the unchosen alternative is revealed as a loss of points is labelled as relief. The emotion in
response to a loss of points when the unchosen alternative is revealed as a win of points, is labelled as
regret. Basedon suggestions that the ability to reason counterfactually about theoutcomesof decisions
continues to develop during childhood and adolescence, we hypothesised age group differences in
emotional responses to chosen outcomes as a function of the outcome of the unchosen alternative in
complete feedback trials.
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Fig. 1. The gambling task: partial feedback condition. On each trial, the participant is presentedwith two gambles (screen 1). The
participant chooses one (screen 2). Once the participant has made a choice, the arrow spins round on the chosen gamble until
it comes to rest on the obtained outcome (screen 3). Finally, the participant indicates his emotional response to the outcome
on a continuous scale from −50 (I feel very negative) to +50 (I feel very positive). In the complete feedback condition, the arrows
spin round on both wheels although the participant only receives the amount indicated on the chosen wheel.
1. Method
1.1. Participants
Pre-adolescent males (aged 9–11; n=20) were from an urban primary school. Adolescent males
(aged12–18;n=52)were froma secondary school in the samearea and atwhich aproportion of school
leavers from the primary school enrol each year. The adolescent group was subdivided into young
adolescents (aged 12–15.5; n=26) and mid-adolescents (aged 15.5–18; n=26). Adult males (aged
25–35; n=17) were recruited from a database of former students of the secondary school. Therefore,
child, adolescent and adult groups were well matched for educational background and socioeconomic
status. Participants were restricted to males to reduce variance attributable to sex differences in traits
such as sensation-seeking, which might inﬂuence risk preferences (Steinberg et al., 2008), and sex
differences in brain maturation (Giedd et al., 1999; Neufang et al., 2009). Previous studies have shown
higher risk-seeking in males than in females (Van Leijenhorst et al., 2008).
1.2. Procedure
On each trial, the participant was presented with two ‘wheels of fortune’ on a computer screen
(Fig. 1). The participant was instructed to choose one of the wheels, with the aim of maximising the
number of points won. Possible wins and losses on each wheel were indicated by positive or negative
numbers next to the wheels. Their associated probabilities were indicated by the relative size of the
sectors of thewheel.When the participant pressed a button indicating his choice, an arrow spun round
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on the wheel and came to rest showing the number of points won or lost on that trial. The participant
was then asked to indicate how he felt using a linear rating scale at the bottom of the screen: from
−50 (extremely negative) to +50 (extremely positive).
The game was played under two conditions, lasting approximately 10min each, preceded by a 5-
trial practice phase. Each condition consisted of 30 self-paced trials, separated by an inter-trial interval
of 1 s. In the partial feedback condition which occurs ﬁrst, the participant was shown the outcome of
the chosen wheel, but not the outcome of the unchosen wheel. In the subsequent complete feedback
condition, the participant was shown the outcomes of both wheels, but only gained the number of
points indicated by the arrow on the chosen wheel. The task was conducted using Cogent software
running in Matlab, which logged behavioural responses.
Possible outcomes took discrete values of +200, +50, −50 or −200 points. Outcome probabilities for
each wheel were 0.2/0.8 or 0.5/0.5. The two alternatives always differed in EV and in the value of their
actual outcomes. Otherwise, pairs of gambles and the combination of probabilities and outcomes
for each gamble were split approximately evenly among possible combinations. Thus, the EV of all
120 gambles ranged from −170 to +170, with a mean and median close to or at zero (mean EV=−8,
median EV=0), and a range of differences in EV between the paired gambles across the 30 trials in each
condition from −195 to +195 (pairings of extreme good EV gambles with extreme bad EV gambles
were avoided as this sort of trial is experienced as an ‘obvious’ choice), with a mean and median close
to zero (mean dEV=3, median dEV=12). The set of pairs of gambles and the order in which they were
presented was the same in each condition.
The task was administered individually to child and adolescent participants in a quiet room at
school, and at the home or workplace of adult participants. Duration was 15–25min, depending on
participant reaction times.
1.3. Data analysis
Datapoints lying >3 s.d. from the grand mean of the dependent variable in each analysis were
considered outliers and were excluded from that analysis.
1.3.1. Logit regression analysis: the effect of expected value and risk on choice
Decision-making was analysed by regression analysis with a panel logit procedure (Camille et al.,
2004; Coricelli et al., 2005). Both random and conditional ﬁxed effects were estimated, and we report
the results for the random effects analysis. This procedure treats each participant as a unit and each
subsequent trial as time and thus the dataset as a sequence of related observations from several units
(participants) identiﬁed by the panel variable. The analysis then identiﬁes the maximum likelihood
of a model of the data that takes into account decision variables, in this case the difference in EV and
risk (variance) between gambles.
In ourmodel, x1 and y1 represent the highest and the lowest outcome of gamble 1 (g1, the left-hand
wheel), and x2 and y2 represent the highest and the lowest outcome of gamble 2 (g2, the right-hand
wheel). The probability of x1 is p and the probability of y1 is 1−p; the probability of x2 is q and the
probability of y2 is 1−q. The probability of choosing gamble 1 is estimated as:
Pr(g1it) = 1 − Pr(g2it) = F[dEVit , dSDit] (1)
where i= individual, t= time and the function F[] denotes the function e/(1 + e). We investigated the
effect on choice of the difference in EV and risk between paired gambles ordered in time, deﬁning the
variables dEV and dSD as:
dEV = EV(g1) − EV(g2) = [(px1 + (1 − p)y1) − (qx2 + (1 − q)y2)] (2)
dSD = stdev(g1) − stdev(g2) (3)
where:
stdev(g1) =
√
[p(x1 − EV(g1))2 + q(y1 − EV(g1))2] (4)
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Table 1
Participant choice behaviour as a function of the difference in expected value (dEV) between gambles and the difference in risk
(dSD) between gambles (a), and as a function of these and other variables (b).
Variable name Coefﬁcient Standard error Z P [95% conf. interval]
(a)
Difference in expected value: dEV 2.1903 0.0580 37.74 <0.001 2.0765 2.3040
Difference in risk: dSD 0.3279 0.0325 10.09 <0.001 0.2642 0.3916
Constant 0.2272 0.0383 5.94 <0.001 0.1522 0.3022
Log likelihood=−2151.0887, Wald 2 = 1453.61, Prob>2 =0.000
(b)
Difference in expected value: dEV 1.3480 0.1711 7.88 <0.001 1.0126 1.6833
Difference in risk: dSD −0.1295 0.3178 −0.41 0.684 −0.7523 0.4933
Interaction between EV and age: dEV× age 0.0522 0.0105 5 <0.001 0.0318 0.0727
Interaction between risk and age: dSD× age 0.0620 0.0335 1.85 0.064 −0.0037 0.1278
Interaction between risk and age2: dSD× age2 −0.0018 0.0008 −2.3 0.022 −0.0033 −0.0003
Constant 0.2292 0.0385 5.95 <0.001 0.1537 0.3047
Log likelihood=−2127.5693, Wald 2(3) = 1413.97, Prob>2 = 0.000
Note. dEV and dSD are orthogonalised and the common variance attributed to dEV. Data are from all trials, totalling 5289
observations and 89 participants.
A participant who maximizes EV and risk will choose g1 if [EV(g1) > EV(g2)] (Eq. (2)), and if
[stdev(g1) > stdev(g2)] (Eq. (3)).
To ascertain whether the impacts of EV and risk on behaviour were dependent on age, we ﬁrst
orthogonalised the two variables dEV and dSD (attributing all the common variance to dEV1) and
then modelled interactions between age and each of the orthogonalised parameters dEV and dSD.
We tested the hypothesis that risk-seeking would show an inverted U-shaped pattern across age by
modelling the interaction between a quadratic function of age (age2) and the impact of risk (dSD)
on behaviour; we also tested for a quadratic relationship between age and EV. In order to directly
compare the models testing for linear and quadratic effects of age on the variables dEV and dSD, we
conducted a likelihood-ratio test.
The outputs of the logit regressions show the coefﬁcients of model parameters (dEV, dSD) and their
associated signiﬁcance levels. A coefﬁcient that is not signiﬁcantly different from zero indicates that
participant behaviour is neutral with respect to that coefﬁcient. For example, participants could be
risk-neutral, or insensitive to EV. A coefﬁcient that is signiﬁcantly different from zero indicates that
participants tend to maximise or minimise the decision variable. The sign of the coefﬁcient indicates
whether the decision variable increases (+) or decreases (−) the probability of choice. For example, a
high, positive coefﬁcient for risk (dSD) indicates that a more risky choice (one with higher outcome
variance) has a higher probability of being chosen. We tested for signiﬁcance of the variables dEV and
dSD across participants and within each age group separately, setting the threshold for signiﬁcance at
p<0.05.
Weﬁrst report a simplemodel, inwhich theutility function is estimatedusing thedecisionvariables
dEV and dSD (Table 1a). We subsequently add the age variable and its interaction with dEV and dSD,
beforeﬁnally testing for quadratic effects by including interactions betweenage2 and the variablesdEV
and dSD. We tested whether the addition of each variable improved the model and report a reduced
model including only the variables that signiﬁcantly explain choice (Table 1b).
1.3.2. Proportion of EV and risk-maximising choices by age group
To complement results from the logit regression analyses, which treat age as a continuous vari-
able and therefore may be inﬂuenced by the distribution of age, we calculated the proportion
of trials for which each of the four age groups selected the gamble that maximized EV or risk.
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used in each case to test for age group differences,
with a p<0.05 threshold for signiﬁcance and Bonferroni corrections applied to post hoc tests. We
1 Reversing the direction of orthogonalisation led to similar results.
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also interrogated the curve resulting from a regression between age2 and the proportion of risky
choices, to locate the point of inﬂection, which is the age at which the proportion of risky choices is
maximal.
1.3.3. Other indices of performance
Mean winnings closely follow the proportion of EV-maximising choices, since a participant who
maximizes EV will win more points. However, we additionally investigated the relationship between
participant age and mean winnings by conducting linear regression analysis. We performed two
regressions, one on the entire group (children, adolescents and adults) and a second on only chil-
dren and adolescents, to rule out the possibility that this effect was driven by two discrete clusters in
age and because we hypothesised that the major differences in performance would occur in this age
range.
To ascertain whether any effects of age on performance were due simply to slower learning of
the task at younger ages (Crone & van der Molen, 2007), rather than to differences in strategy, we
conducted linear regression analyses between age and the difference in mean winnings between the
ﬁrst and second 15 of the 30 trials per condition, as well as one-way ANOVA on the mean difference in
winnings between the ﬁrst and second halves of each condition, with age group as a between-subjects
factor.
1.3.4. Strength of counterfactually mediated emotions and overall emotional response by age group
We hypothesised that the effect on emotion ratings of a counterfactual comparison between the
chosen and the unchosen outcome would differ by age. To test this hypothesis, we selected trials
for which a counterfactual comparison could either enhance or diminish the degree of satisfaction a
participant would feel. That is, we selected trials from the complete feedback condition for which the
obtained outcome was either +50 or −50, and the unchosen alternative was either +200 or −200. To
clarify, consider a counterexample: if a participant wins +200 points, any unobtained outcome (+50,
−50 or −200)would have beenworse; the counterfactual comparisonwill always be in the downward
direction and will always be confounded with outcome magnitude. In contrast, a win of −50 appears
satisfactory if the unobtained outcome is revealed to be −200, but unsatisfactory if the unobtained
outcome is revealed to be +200. Emotion ratings from the latter trial types were therefore used to
examine age group differences, using one-way ANOVA with a threshold for signiﬁcance at p<0.05,
and Bonferroni corrections to post hoc t-tests.
We investigated overall differences in emotion reports by age and condition by conducting mixed
model repeated-measures 2×2×4 ANOVA on emotion reports, with Bonferroni-corrected post hoc
t-tests to investigate simple effects. Because order effects (the partial condition always occurred
ﬁrst) may contribute to a main effect of feedback or interactions thereof, we report only those age-
independent effects that replicate previous results (Bault, Coricelli, & Rustichini, 2008; Camille et al.,
2004; Coricelli et al., 2005).
2. Results
2.1. Performance
2.1.1. Behavioural sensitivity to the difference in EV between gambles
Logit regression analysis showed that in both conditions, across participants as well as within each
age group, the difference in EV between gambles affected choice. Participants exhibited a behavioural
preference for gambles with higher EV. Because behaviour with regard to EV was similar across con-
ditions, and in order to increase power, we collapsed across conditions. Thus, for all 89 participants, as
well as within each age group, EV coefﬁcient dEV>0, with p<0.001 (Table 1a). However, participant
age modulated the extent to which the difference in EV between gambles affected choice (interac-
tion between age and dEV coefﬁcient, dEV× age>0, p<0.001; Table 1b), such that the impact of the
difference in EV between gambles on choice behaviour increased with increasing age. That is, older
participants exhibited a stronger behavioural preference for gambles with higher EV than did younger
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Fig. 2. Mean winnings across the task show a positive correlation with age (ˇ =0.280, r2 = 0.078, p=0.009). Two outliers >3 s.d.
away from the mean were excluded. Note that the two lower data points shown in this ﬁgure are not outliers by this deﬁnition;
the linear relationship remains signiﬁcant when these lower data points are excluded (see text for details).
participants. The interaction between age2 and dEV was not signiﬁcant and was therefore removed
from the model.
To assesswhether the relationshipbetweenageand the impact of EVonchoicewasbetterdescribed
as linear or quadratic, we conducted a likelihood-ratio test. This showed that adding a quadratic
component for the interaction between age and dEV (dEV× age2) did not signiﬁcantly improve the
model (likelihood-ratio test: LR 2(1) =1.47, p=0.226). Therefore, we can conclude the effect of age
on dEV is linear.
2.1.2. Proportion of EV-maximising choices by age group
One-way ANOVA on the proportion of trials for which participants in each of the four age groups
chose the gamble with higher EV was not signiﬁcant (F3,85 = 2.354, p=0.078).
2.1.3. Relation between age and mean winnings
Linear regression analysis showed that mean winnings across the task were positively correlated
with age (mean winnings: ˇ =0.280, r2 =0.078, p=0.009; two outliers were excluded: one YA, one
MA2; see Fig. 2). This result is consistent with the logit regression result showing an age-related
increase in EV-maximising behaviour. To rule out the possibility that this effect was driven by two
discrete clusters in age, we carried out a second linear regression analysis on mean winnings against
age for the child and adolescent groups only. It showed that mean winnings across the task were also
positively correlated with age across this age range (ˇ =0.340, r2 =0.115, p=0.004).
2.1.4. Effect of age on learning
Linear regressionbetweenage and thedifference inmeanwinnings between theﬁrst and second15
of the 30 trials per condition, as well as one-way ANOVA on the mean difference in winnings between
ﬁrst and second halves of both conditions, with age group as a between-subjects factor, revealed no
signiﬁcant effect of age (regression p=0.879; no outliers) or age group (F3,84 = 0.204, p=0.894; one YA
excluded due to incomplete partial condition) on the difference in mean winnings between the ﬁrst
and second halves of each condition.
2 Note that this result is the samewhen the twooutliers’ data are included (ˇ =0.261, r2 = 0.068,p=0.001), and the relationship
remains signiﬁcant when the two lower data points shown in Fig. 2 (which lie within 3 s.d. of the mean and are thus not outliers
by our deﬁnition) are excluded (ˇ =0.265, r2 = 0.070, p=0.015).
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2.2. Risk-seeking
2.2.1. Behavioural sensitivity to the difference in risk between gambles
Logit regression analysis showed that across age groups, the difference in risk between gambles
(see Eq. (3)) affected choice. Overall, participants exhibited a behavioural preference for more risky
gambles, that is, gambles with higher outcome variance (risk coefﬁcient dSD>0, p<0.001; Table 1a).
The difference in risk between gambles also predicted choice in each of the three younger groups (risk
coefﬁcient dSD>0, p=0.004 for child group, and p<0.001 for YA and MA groups), but not in the Adult
group alone (p>0.7). Thus, children and adolescents showed a preference for more risky gambles and
adults did not.
2.2.2. Non-linear relation between age and the impact of risk on behaviour
A signiﬁcant quadratic interaction between age and dSD indicated that age inﬂuenced the extent
to which the difference in risk between gambles affected choice (coefﬁcient dSD× age2 >0, p=0.022;
Table 1b). Choicewasnot predictedby a linear function of risk× age (coefﬁcientdSD× age: 1,p=0.064;
Table 1b). To directly compare linear vs. quadratic effects of dSD, we conducted a likelihood-ratio test.
It showed that adding a quadratic component for the interaction between age and the risk coefﬁcient
(dSD× age2) to a model only containing the linear component (dSD× age) signiﬁcantly improved the
model (likelihood-ratio test: LR 2(1) =5.31, p=0.021). Therefore, we can conclude the effect of age
on the propensity to seek risk is quadratic.
2.2.3. Proportion of risk-maximising choices by age group
One-way ANOVA on the proportion of trials for which participants in each age group chose the
gamble with higher risk was signiﬁcant, F3,85 = 3.077, p=0.032. Fig. 3 shows the proportion of risky
choices by age group. For the purposes of illustration, a quadratic function has been ﬁt to the group
data. Paired post hoc Bonferroni corrected comparisons showed that the YA group made a signiﬁcantly
greater proportion of risk-maximising choices than did the adult group (p=0.021; all other compar-
isons p>0.2). Interrogation of the curve resulting from a regression between age2 as a continuous
variable and the proportion of risky choices revealed that the point of inﬂection was located at 14.38
years. That is, 14.38 is the age at which participants made the greatest proportion of risky choices.
Fig. 3. Theproportionof riskychoicesdifferedacross agegroups (one-wayANOVA: F3,85=3.077,p= .032). Theyoungadolescent
groupmade a signiﬁcantly greater proportion of risk-maximising choices than did the adult group (paired comparisons: p= .021
for YAvs. adult). The graph is ﬁtwith a quadratic function for purposes of illustration; a quadratic ﬁt between age as a continuous
variable and proportion of risky choices showed a point of inﬂection at age 14.38 years, and logit regression revealed an inverted
U-shape relation between age and the inﬂuence of risk on choice (Table 1b).
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Fig. 4. The strength of counterfactually mediated emotion ratings (relief and regret) is greater in the young adolescent than in
the child group as shown by one-way ANOVA (F3,83=3.155, p=0.029) with Bonferroni-corrected paired post hoc tests (child
vs. young adolescent mean difference =6.74, p=0.037).
2.3. Emotion ratings following outcomes
2.3.1. Strength of counterfactually mediated emotion by age group
One-way ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant effect of age group (F3,83 = 3.155, p=0.029; two outliers
were excluded3) on the strength (magnitude) of counterfactually mediated reported emotions (relief
and regret). We considered counterfactually mediated emotions to be the emotion ratings elicited in
response to a win of ±50 when the unobtained outcome was −200 (relief) or +200 (regret). Paired
post hoc Bonferroni-corrected comparisons revealed signiﬁcantly weaker counterfactually mediated
emotion ratings in the child than in the YA group (mean difference 6.74, p=0.037), while no other
comparisons reached signiﬁcance (Fig. 4).
In contrast, investigation of overall differences in emotion intensity across age and condition
showed no evidence of stronger emotion ratings in adolescence, nor any interactions between age
and within-groups factors. This suggests that the age group difference in emotion ratings reported
above is speciﬁc to reported emotions elicited in response to a counterfactual comparison between
chosen and unchosen alternatives. We did, however, replicate previous ﬁndings (Bault et al., 2008;
Coricelli et al., 2005) by showing an inﬂuence on emotion ratings of valence (F1,83 = 400.45, p<0.001)
and feedback (F1,83 = 9.84, p=0.002), and an interaction between these factors (F1,83 = 39.82, p<0.001).
2.3.2. Post hoc tests on emotion and risk
We conducted post hoc t-tests on child vs. YA differences in counterfactually mediated emotion
ratings separately for positive and negative outcomes to investigate whether the stronger emotion
ratings in YA relative to children were driven by a hyper-responsiveness to positive rather than neg-
ative outcomes (Casey et al., 2008; Ernst et al., 2005; Eshel et al., 2007). Independent samples t-tests
revealed higher YA than child emotion ratings on relief (‘lucky escape’) trials (t43 =−2.22, p=0.02, 1-
tailed), whereas the same comparison for regret trials was not signiﬁcant (t43 = .73, p=0.24, 1-tailed).
This post hoc result suggests that the YA group showed an enhanced emotional response to relief or
‘lucky escape’ outcomes relative to the child group.
3 Outliers were one Child whose data lay +3.21 s.d. away from the mean, and one Adult whose data lay +4.31 away from the
mean.
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To assess whether this difference predicted risk-taking, we conducted linear regression analyses
between the emotion response on relief trials and the proportion of risky choices. This analysis was
not signiﬁcant for the full sample (ˇ =0.176, r2 =0.031, p=0.103), but was signiﬁcant within child and
YA groups together (ˇ =0.305, r2 =0.093, p=0.041), and was marginally signiﬁcant within child, YA
and MA groups together (ˇ =0.228, r2 =0.052, p=0.056). It was not signiﬁcant in the adult group alone
(ˇ =0.067, r2 =0.005, p=0.804). This suggests that children and adolescents become less cautious
in their choices after surprisingly lucky (relieving) wins. However, this conclusion is tentative and
requires further investigation because these correlations do not survive Bonferroni correction for
multiple comparisons.
3. Discussion
Our results showed that among males in a probabilistic gambling task, the ability to maximise
EV increased linearly with age, whereas risk-seeking showed a quadratic relationship with age and
the proportion of risky choices peaked in mid-adolescence. This is one of the ﬁrst behavioural stud-
ies to provide evidence for an inverted U-shaped relation between age and risky decision-making.
In addition, we found an increase between childhood and adolescence in the strength of counter-
factually mediated reported emotions, although individual emotion ratings did not predict risky
decision-making across age.
3.1. Development of optimal decision-making: sensitivity to EV
Participants made a series of decisions between paired gambles that differed in EV, the sum of
possible outcomes of a gamble weighted by their probabilities. All age groups showed evidence of
taking EV into account when making decisions. At all ages, decisions were predicted by a model in
which gambles with high EV were preferentially chosen over gambles with low EV, a result consistent
with previous studies (see Boyer, 2006, for review).
However, the extent to which participants maximised EV varied by age (Table 1b). Older partic-
ipants were more likely to make decisions that maximised EV. Since mean winnings closely follow
the proportion of EV-maximising choices, a positive correlation between age and mean winnings was
found. Therefore, performance on the task improved with age (Fig. 2). As shown by analysis of the
difference in winnings between the ﬁrst and second 15 of the 30 trials per condition, this age trend
was not due simply to slower learning of the task at younger ages, but is likely to reﬂect stable age
differences in strategy.
Our results are in agreement with ﬁndings from previous studies. In a behavioural eco-
nomic study conducted by Harbaugh et al. (2002) in which participants aged 5–64 years chose
between a certain outcome and a gamble with equivalent EV, the proportion of optimal, unbi-
ased choices increased with age throughout childhood and adolescence. A study by Levin et al.
(2007) showed similar age-related increases in the tendency to maximise EV among children
(aged 5–7), pre-adolescents (aged 8–11) and adults. The present study extends this developmen-
tal picture by showing that the ability to maximize EV when choosing between two gambles
(rather than a gamble and a sure thing) shows linear development during late childhood and
adolescence.
A recent study conducted by Figner et al. (2009) showed that the propensity to take into account
relevant probability and reward information continued to mature between adolescence (age 13–18)
and adulthood (20+). Interestingly, this developmental difference was only found using an emotional
(‘hot’) version of the task. In an unemotional (‘cold’) version of the same task, there were no age
differences. Due to the emotional component of our gambling task (participants reported their
emotional response to gamble outcomes, including unchosen ones), it is may be similar to the
‘hot’ task of Figner et al. (2009) and is therefore in agreement with a previous study. However Van
Leijenhorst et al. (2008) found no age differences between 8 and 30 years in the ability to maximise
reward in a wheel of fortune task. Further studies are needed to clarify the source of this discrepancy,
but a suggestion could be the difference in extent to which the attention of participants was directed
to unchosen or unobtained outcomes. Development in the ability to maximise EV found here may
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be partially due to the ampliﬁed emotional responses elicited by the comparison between the actual
outcome and ‘what might have been’.
3.2. Developmental proﬁle of risk-taking
In the present task, paired gambles differed in risk (measured as outcome variance; Bossaerts &
Hsu, 2008). The child group and both adolescent groups showed evidence of taking risk into account
when making decisions. In these age groups, decisions were predicted by a model in which gambles
with high risk were preferentially chosen over gambles with low risk. In contrast, the adult group
showed no evidence of taking risk into account when making decisions; adults were risk-neutral.
The extent of risk maximisation differed by age. There was an inverted U-shaped relationship
between age and the inﬂuence of risk on decision-making. Logit regression showed that the impact
of the difference in risk between alternatives increased with age at the younger end of the age range.
Toward the middle of the age range, the increase in impact of the difference in risk started to decrease
with age. By adulthood, the effect was reversed. That is, adolescents showed the strongest tendency
to select high-risk gambles. In addition, there was a signiﬁcant effect of age on the proportion of
trials for which participants selected the high risk alternative. Young adolescents (aged 12–15) made
a signiﬁcantly greater proportion of risky choices than did adults, and the age at which risky choices
peaked was 14.38 years (Fig. 3).
These results expand on those from two previous studies that have shown that the tendency to
make risky decisions in emotional gambling tasks decreases between adolescence and adulthood (age
11–15 vs. age 21–31, Eshel et al., 2007; age 13–19 vs. age 20+, Figner et al., 2009). However, it has
been suggested that the tendency to make risky decisions shows an inverted U-shaped relation to
age, from childhood through adolescence and into adulthood. Ours is one of the ﬁrst empirical studies
to demonstrate such an inverted U-shaped relationship, using a behavioural task assessing decision-
making under risk. This result complements theoretical and observational studies. Epidemiological
studies show a peak during adolescence in ‘risky’ activities such as dangerous driving (Eaton et al.,
2008), which has led to the suggestion of an inverted U-shaped relationship between age and the
propensity to be risk-seeking, with its peak in adolescence (Casey et al., 2008; Steinberg et al., 2008).
However, choosing to engage in real life ‘risky’ activities is likely to have a variety of underlying causes
andas suchdoesnot constitute apreference for risk in abehavioural economic sense. Thepresent study
is an important step toward clarifying the conditions under which adolescents take risks relative to
children as well as adults, as it has shown an experimental context in which adolescents appear
risk-seeking.
3.3. Development of the counterfactually mediated emotions of relief and regret
In this study, participants rated their emotional response to the outcome of each gamble. On half
of the trials (complete feedback condition) they were shown the outcome for the unchosen, as well as
chosen, wheel. Previous work with adults has shown that such feedback gives rise to a counterfactual
comparison between the outcome of a choice (reality) and its foregone alternative (what might have
been), and that this comparison inﬂuences participants’ emotional responses as well as their subse-
quent behaviour (Coricelli et al., 2005). We investigated age differences in the emotional response
to situations in which the outcome for the unchosen gamble was revealed as either better (result-
ing in regret) or worse (resulting in relief) than that for the chosen gamble. The magnitude of relief
and regret differed by age, with young adolescents (aged 12–15) reporting stronger emotions than
children (aged 9–11). This result is consistent with the suggestion that the ability to reason counter-
factually about the outcomes of decisions is still developing during adolescence (Baird & Fugelsang,
2004).
Post hoc tests indicated that the increased magnitude of counterfactually mediated emotions in
young adolescents relative to children was driven by a more strongly positive response to relief out-
comes, which can be conceptualised as ‘lucky escapes’. This result is compatible with a developmental
picture of heightened reward sensitivity in adolescents relative to children (Steinberg et al., 2008).
Further studies are needed to replicate and extend this developmental ﬁnding. A preliminary sug-
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gestion is that adolescents are prone to make incautious decisions after surprisingly lucky (relieving)
outcomes.
3.4. Relations between emotions and risk-taking
Our ﬁndings lend weight to the suggestion that risk-taking in adolescence cannot solely be
explained by an inability to gauge the most advantageous course of action, for if this were the case
children would take more risks. As has been suggested elsewhere (Casey et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2008),
adolescent risk-taking arises due to an interaction between two separate developmental trends—a
gradual improvement in cognitive control-related abilities (here contributing to improvements in the
ability to maximize EV), superimposed upon non-linear trajectories of sensation-seeking and socio-
emotional factors. We found that the increase in risk-taking coincided with an increased strength of
counterfactuallymediated emotions (in particular, relief). However, individual emotion scores did not
strongly predict risk-taking. This may reﬂect a lack of power in the present study; alternatively, some
other measure of emotional responding, or a cognitive variable (Galvan, Hare, Voss, Glover, & Casey,
2007), may be a more proximal predictor of individual risk-taking. Future studies designed to test the
relationship between risk-taking and the emotional response to a ‘lucky escape’ will shed more light
on this issue.
Distinct developmental trajectories for EV-maximising vs. risk-taking suggest that adolescents
do not engage in risky behaviours simply because they are unable to estimate the negative conse-
quences of their decisions.We found that young adolescents showedanenhancement of the emotional
response to relief outcomes (a ‘lucky escape’) relative to children, although they did not differ from
adults on this measure. We presented tentative evidence that these relief responses predict risky
choices. However, further studies are needed to establishwhich social-emotional and cognitive factors
most strongly contribute to adolescent risk-taking both in females and in the males studied here.
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